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STUDENT NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW-CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY-A PRAGMATIC APPROACH
TO THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
I. INTRODUCTION
The defense of "lack-of-criminal-responsibility," while oc-
cupying only a minor percentage of criminal jury trials,I is highly
significant since an individual found not guilty by reason of insan-
ity is essentially excused' of having committed the "heinous"
crime with which he was charged.' An initial, yet often overlooked,
concern when contemplating the use of the "lack-of-criminal-
responsibility" defense is the distinction between mental compe-
tency4 and criminal responsibility. Although a discussion of men-
, "[The] defense-of-insanity trials represent only about two per cent of all
criminal jury trials .... " R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 213
(1967).
2 The reason for exculpation due to insanity is stated in a variety of
ways. One of the most familiar formulations is that there cannot be a
crime if the actor did not have the requisite mental state, referred to also
as "mens rea," or "guilty mind." The reasoning is that illness may cause
a mental impairment analogus to that of the person who acts in ignorance
of the facts. Such a person should not be considered blameworthy. If he
is not blameworthy, then it is unfair to convict him of a crime. Some other
disposition (such as hospitalization) may be appropriate, but not convic-
tion of crime.
A. BROOKS, LAw, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 111 (1974).
There is voluminous literature on the insanity defense. The following is a
partial list of some of the readings in this area of the law: R. ARENS, INSANITY
DEFENSE (1974) (a good discussion of the Durham rule); J. BRIoGS, JR., THE GUILTY
MIND (1955) (an excellent historical analysis of the development of the relationship
between law and psychiatry); A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH
SYSTEM 111-319 (1974) (a comprehensive analysis of the problems and issues that
arise with the insanity defense); A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967) (a good
practical discussion of the insanity defense); H. GOULETr, THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN
CRIMINAL TRIALS (1965) (the "how-to" book); I. RAY, A TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY (1962) (an interesting discussion of the various types of
insanity one may encounter); H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL
DEFENSE (1954) (although somewhat dated, a thorough analysis of the area).
To be competent to stand trial a defendant must have, at the time
of his trial, "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of understanding-and. . . a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him."
United States v. Taylor, 437 F.2d 371, 375 (4th Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted).
I A claim that the defendant was not criminally responsible . . . is
1
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tal competency is generally outside the scope of this article, a
consideration of some of its more salient aspects is justified by its
importance within the criminal justice system.' Recognizing the
significance of competency determinations, Congress has provided
a specific mechanism that may be utilized by either the defense,
the United States Attorney, or even the Court, sua sponte,7 to
determine the competency of the accused.' The Fourth Circuit has
construed the parameters of this mechanism, 18 U.S.C.A. § 4244
(1969), on numerous occasions. When the motion is made raising
the defense of competency,9 the district court is generally required
to grant the motion, 0 but is certainly not without discretion in the
unconcerned with the defendant's understanding of his situation at the
time of the trial, but is directed entirely to his capacity to understand
and to control his conduct at the time of the commission of the offense.
Id.
' "For each defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity, at least a hundred
defendants are found incompetent to stand trial and sent to institutions for the
'criminally insane.' "A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM
332 (1974). See M. GUTTMACHER, THE ROLE OF PSYCHIATRY IN LAW 97-103 (1968);
Kaufman, Evaluating Competency: Are Constitutional Deprevations Necessary?,
10 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 465 (1972).
1 "Of his or its own will or motion; voluntarily; without prompting or sugges-
tion." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1592 (4th ed. Rev. 1968).
9 18 U.S.C.A. § 4244 (1969) provides in part:
Whenever after arrest and prior to the imposition of sentence or prior to
the expiration of any period of probation the United States Attorney has
reasonable cause to believe that a person charged with an offense against
the United States may be presently insane or otherwise so mentally in-
competent as to be unable to understand the proceedings against him or
properly assist in his own defense, he shall file a motion for a judicial
determination of such mental competency of the accused, setting forth
the ground for such belief with the trial court in which proceedings are
pending. Upon such a motion or upon a similar motion in behalf of the
accused, or upon its own motion, the court shall cause the accused,
whether or not previously admitted to bail, to be examined as to his
mental condition by at least one qualified psychiatrist, who shall report
to the court. For the purpose of the examination the court may order the
accused committed for such reasonable period as the court may deter-
mine to a suitable hospital or other facility to be designated by the court.
If the report of the psychiatrist indicates a state of present insanity or
such mental incompetency in the accused, the court shall hold a hearing,
upon due notice, at which evidence as to the mental condition of the
accused may be submitted, including that of the reporting psychiatrist,
and make a finding with respect thereto.
Although one might prefer to make this motion in writing, "[a]n oral motion
is sufficient to invoke the provisions of § 4244." United States v. Burgin, 440 F.2d
1092, 1094 (4th Cir. 1971).
1- 18 U.S.C.A. § 4244 requires the court on proper motion to order a
2
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matter." Furthermore, the determination by the district court will
not "be set aside on review unless it is clearly arbitrary or unwar-
ranted."' 2 Significantly, the motion must state the grounds sup-
porting the defendant's contention that he is incompetent to be
tried.'" If the district court grants the motion to have the defendant
examined by a psychiatrist, the defendant does not have a right
to choose the physician by whom he will be examined. If the
motion is denied, one may appeal on the ground of an abuse of
discretion by the district court. If the appellate court determines
that the mental examination was erroneously denied, then "the
only way to correct an erroneous § 4244 determination of compe-
tency to stand trial is to reverse the conviction and remand to the
district court for a new trial if the accused should be found compe-
tent.",'
psychiatric examination for a defendant when at any time after arrest
and before imposition of sentence there is a reasonable cause to believe
that he is insane or otherwise mentally incompetent.
Hall v. United States, 410 F.2d 653, 657 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 970 (1969).
A district court is required to grant a § 4244 motion for a mental examina-
tion unless the motion is not made in good faith or the grounds for the
motion are frivolous.
United States v. Burgin, 440 F.2d 1092, 1094 (4th Cir. 1971).
" "[I]t does not follow . . . that upon such a showing [pursuant to § 42441
the district court is stripped of discretion and must blindly and automatically
implement the statutory machinery." Hall v. United States, 410 F.2d 653, 657 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 970 (1969).
22 Id. at 658.
'3 In United States v. Taylor, 437 F.2d 371 (4th Cir. 1971), the Fourth Circuit,
in stating what a defendant's § 4244 motion did not contain, indirectly suggested
what such a motion should allege:
The motions did not allege that his attorney had ever experienced any
difficulty in communication or that Taylor had on any occasion exhibited
an impaired understanding of the proceedings or of the charges against
him. 437 F.2d at 376. [N]either the defendant's appearance nor his
history as recited in the motion provided any reason to question whether
he possessed a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings or
could assist his attorney to the extent any untrained defendant could
assist, in preparing a case. 437 F.2d at 376 n.7.
" United States v. Davis, 481 F.2d 425 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 977
(1973).
11 United States v. Burgin, 440 F.2d 1092, 1095 (4th Cir. 1971). For additional
discussions of the mental competency issue in the Fourth Circuit, see United States
v. Retolaza, 398 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1032 (1969); United
States v. McGinnis, 384 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 990 (1968);
United States v. Schmidt, 376 F.2d 751 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 884 (1967);
Kibert v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1967); Hawks v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 123 (4th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 925 (1967); James v. Boles, 339 F.2d 431 (4th Cir.
1964); United States v. Kendrick, 331 F.2d 110 (4th Cir. 1964).
[Vol. 78
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If the defendant is determined to be incompetent to stand
trial, he is not necessarily committed to the custody of a mental
institution. In United States v. Curry,6 the Fourth Circuit held
that a trial court should not commit a defendant into custody
"unless and until the court shall also have determined that the
defendant might, if released, be a public or private danger.' 17 In
ascertaining whether the defendant is a danger, he may be de-
tained for a reasonable period of time;'5 unless the defendant is
found to be dangerous, a finding of incompetency to stand trial
does not compel commitment. 9
The foregoing analysis clearly indicates the concern of the
Fourth Circuit in providing the mentally incompetent defendant
a maximum of constitutional protections." The mechanism is
available to provide justice to the mentally incompetent defendant
and the burden is placed squarely upon the shoulders of counsel
to insure its maximum utilization.2 '
I. TEST OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
The most significant case decided by the Fourth Circuit in the
area of criminal responsibility is United States v. Chandler.1' The
import of Chandler3 stems primarily from its adoption of the
American Law Institute'su insanity formulation.2 The Court in
11 410 F.2d 1372 (4th Cir. 1969). One can find an interesting explanation of this
case in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 733 (1972).
17 Id. at 1374.
' Id.
"Collectively the statutes intend that a defendant, although found incompe-
tent, cannot be unduly deprived of his liberty unless he will be dangerous to so-
ciety." Id.
The development of the law concerning the rights of the mentally incompe-
tent insofar as the states are concerned may be found in Drope v. Missouri, 95 S.Ct.
896 (1975).
21 The burden is indeed heavy. See discussion of incompetency of counsel,
notes 85-92 and accompanying text infra.
393 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1968) (en banc).
For a more thorough analyses of Chandler, see Weiner, Judge Sobeloff's
Influence Upon Criminal Reform, 34 MD. L. REV. 532 (1974); Note, Criminal
Insanity-Another M'Naghten?, 23 U. Muami L. REv. 644 (1969); 21 S.C. L. REV.
122 (1968).
21 Hereinafter cited as A.L.I.
21 The A.L.I. formulation of criminal responsibility adopted by the Fourth
Circuit is as follows:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capac-
4
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Chandler was quick to point out that, although it approved of the
A.L.I. formulation, it did not require rigid adherence to its lan-
guage."5
Notwithstanding the flexibility advocated by the Court in
Chandler, the A.L.I. formulation"7 is unequivocally the standard
for criminal responsibility in the Fourth Circuit and, as such, de-
mands close scrutiny. In the first paragraph of the A.L.I. rule there
are five relevant concepts: "(1) mental disease or defect, (2) lack
of substantial capacity, (3) appreciation, (4) wrongfulness [in the
Fourth Circuit the term "criminality" is substituted], (5) con-
formity of conduct to the requirements of law."
The first concept, "mental disease or defect", is considered
more expansionary than previous rules because the term "defect"
is added. This added term "broadens the test to include persons
who are retarded, whose conditions might not be regarded as either
'disease' or illness."'"
The second concept, "lack of substantial capacity," is a con-
cept that has occasioned much controversy. The term is so con-
ity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law.
(2) The term [sic] 'mental disease or defect' do not include an abnor-
mality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social con-
duct.
393 F.2d at 926. See Model Penal Code § 4.01 (1962).
" We ought not fall into the egregious error of the last century,
however. Approval of any standard or form of instruction need not, and
should not, freeze the language or solidify thought .... We should not
prescribe for invariable use a form of words which may be less appropriate'
than another in the light of the testimony in a particular case and which
might tend to live on long after more rational solutions have been uncov-
ered.
393 F.2d at 926-27.
2 The Fourth Circuit is not alone in its adoption of the A.L.I. formulation. The
test has been almost universally adopted, in one form or another, by the United
States Circuit Courts of Appeal. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (en banc); United States v. Herrington, 440 F.2d 1041 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 842, reh. denied, 404 U.S. 960 (1971); Wade v. United States, 426
F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970); Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1969) (en
banc); United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1967) (en banc); United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d
606 (2d Cir. 1966); Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963) (en banc),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1964); United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir.
1961). But see Beltran v. United States, 302 F.2d 48 (1st Cir. 1962).
21 A. BROoKs, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 168 (1974).
29 Id.
[Vol. 78
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structed as to eliminate "the occasional references in the older
cases to 'complete' or 'total' destruction of the normal capacity of
the defendant."30 This phrase has been subject to the charge of
being unduly vague,3' and such attack may not be entirely unjusti-
fied because the A.L.I. drafters were not entirely clear in their
definition of the concept.2 The one conclusion reasonably certain
from the concept of "lack of substantial capacity," is "that 'any'
incapacity is not sufficient to justify avoidance of criminal respon-
sibility but that 'total' incapacity is also unnecessary.''"
The third concept in the A.L.I. formulation, that of "apprecia-
tion," was adopted to liberalize the cognative aspect of the test. 4
This portion of the test is subject to criticism because its liberality
may not bear fruit without the concerted involvement of the judge
in explaining the implications of this term to the jury.35 It would
certainly appear to be incumbent upon counsel to aid the judge in
his explanation of the various elements of the A.L.I; formulation
to the jury. 6 The fourth concept, "criminality," would seem to be
the least difficult of the five elements of the A.L.I. formulation.
A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANrrY DEFENSE 87 (1967).
31 How substantial is "substantial?" We can all agree that substan-
tial means something more than slight or than just a very little. But how
much more? (And, incidentally, does not the provision that the accused's
capacities must have been so substantially impaired that he cannot justly
be held responsible amount to a non-illuminative circular statement?)
S. GLUECK, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 22 (1962).
32 It is not entirely clear, however, what the drafters meant by the
word "substantial." On one hand, they spoke of avoiding "total" impair-
ment. On the other, they spoke of an impairment reflecting "the most
severe afflications of the mind."
A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 168 (1974).
33 Id.
1' It substitutes "appreciate" for "know," thereby indicating a pref-
erence for the view that a sane offender must be emotionally as well as
intellectually aware of the significance of his conduct.
A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 87 (1967).
Mere intellectual awarbness . . . when divorced from appreciation or
understanding of the moral or legal import of behavior can have little
significance.
A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 169 (1974)
1 To make the A.L.I. formulation operate as an improvement, it will
be necessary for the judge to bring out the deeper and more comprehen-
sive meanings of the concept "appreciate" to an extent that will counter-
act the average juryman's interpretation of it as equivalent to simple and
superficial cognition ....
S. GLUECK, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 69 (1962).
1 See discussion of instructions notes 155-162 and accompanying text infra.
6
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The requirement is injected into the test for the purpose of requir-
ing that the accused appreciate that his conduct is of a criminal
nature. The fifth concept embodied in Paragraph One of the A.L.I.
formulation surrounds "conformity of conduct to the requirements
of the law." The key to this last concept lies in the word "conform-
ity," which is a major shift from the requirements of the
M'Naghten Rule31 The use of the term "conformity" marks the
A.L.I. drafters' departure from the term "control," thereby divorc-
ing the formulation from the shackles of the "irresistible impulse"
test.18
The second paragraph 9 of the A.L.I. formulation, also
adopted by the Fourth Circuit,4" was added to the test "pur-
portedly to exclude sociopaths from consideration."'" Critics of
the second paragraph claim that it is ineffective because psycho-
pathy is never really manifested only by repeated criminal or
otherwise anti-social conduct.2
The A.L.I. formulation is clearly designed to liberalize the
standard for determining lack-of-criminal responsibility. 3 Al-
though the A.L.I. formulation is not without fault, its adoption by
the Fourth Circuit mandates a thorough grasp of its conceptual
implications.44
Subsequent to Chandler, the Fourth Circuit has reconsidered
the implications of the A.L.I. formulation on numerous occasions.
37 See A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 169 (1974).
But see Note, Criminal Insanity-Another MVNaghten? 23 U. MIAMI L. REv. 644,
650 n.46 (1969).
3' See A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 87 (1967).
11 "(2) the terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal behavior or otherwise anti-social conduct."
See note 25 supra.
, United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920, 926 (4th Cir. 1968).
" M. GUTTMACHER, THE ROLE OF PSYCHIATRY IN LAW 39 (1968).
42 A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 88 (1967). See A. BROOKS, LAW, Psy-
CHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 171-76 (1974).
, Higley, Requirements of Uniformity and the Federal Formulation of Crimi-
nal Responsibility, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 421, 435 (1971-72).
" Additional works that may be consulted in analyzing the A.L.I. formulation
are as follows: F. BAILEY & H. ROTHBLATT, CRIMES OF VIOLENCE: RAPE AND OTHER
SEX CRIMES § 408 (1973); Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United
States: The Model Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1425 (1968); Note, Criminal
Law-The A.L.I. Model Penal Code Insanity Test, 44 TUL. L. REV. 192 (1969);
Annot., 1 A.L.R. Fed. 965 (1969). Additionally, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
extensively analyzed the A.L.I. formulation in United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d
969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc).
[Vol. 78
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In United States v. Wilson,4 5 the Court commented on the
necessity for the development of the factual basis of a psychia-
trist's testimony on the issue of mental responsibility under the
A.L.I. test." The Wilson Court also discussed the "powers of con-
trol" aspect of the A.L.I. formulation 47 and excluded from the con-
trol aspect of the test those persons who possessed a "substantial
capacity" to choose whether or not to control themselves. 8
Shortly after Wilson was decided, the Fourth Circuit again
considered the implications of Chandler in the case of United
States v. Butler.9 In Butler, the Court reiterated its endorsement
of the A.L.I. formulation 0 and discussed the effect of this insanity
test upon examination of witnesses and instructions to the jury. In
both categories, witness examination and instructions, the A.L.I.
formulation was to permit a higli degree of flexibility.5' The trial
court should permit extensive examination of medical witnesses to
allow "a full exposition before the jury of the defendant's personal-
ity and mental processes."52 In the area of instructions, as long as
the charge on insanity substantially complied with the A.L.I. rule,
it was not objectionable. 3 The Fourth Circuit undeniably advo-
cated a position of maximum flexibility when the issue of insanity
was raised. 4
' 399 F.2d 459 (4th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 462. See Weiner, Judge Sobelofi's Influence Upon Criminal Reform,
34 MD. L. REv. 532, 538 (1974).
" 399 F.2d at 463.
" Its references to powers of control, as emphasized by the caveat,
do not encompass those who do not wish to control and restrain their
conduct as contrasted with those whose controls are not governed by their
wishes. As long as an individual has a substantial capacity for choice, he
does not escape the law's criminal sanctions because he chooses impru-
dently or so prefers his immediate self-interests that he is prepared to
commit deliberate transgressions whenever he thinks they will advantage
him and he will not be caught.
Id.
" 409 F.2d 1261 (4th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 1263.
Id. at 1262.
52 Id.
5 Id.
11 In discussing both Wilson, supra note 46, and Butler, supra note 49, the
comment has been made that "the Fourth Circuit, rather than adhere to legal
formalism, has developed a workable test for criminal responsibility." Weiner,
Judge Sobeloff's Influence Upon Criminal Reform, 34 MD. L. Rav. 532, 539 (1974).
434 F.2d 844 (4th Cir. 1970).
8
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In United States v. McGirr,15 the Fourth Circuit reversed the
ruling of the trial court that denied Joseph James McGirr's request
'to withdraw his guilty plea. McGirr's request was premised upon
the belief that he was not criminally responsible. The district court
ruled that McGirr's claim was without merit, but the Fourth Cir-
cuit disagreed, suggesting that McGirr may have been criminally
irresponsible, 56 and, as such, was a question to be presented to the
jury.57 McGirr is also significant because of the Court's extensive
discussion of certain important factors revealed by the psychiatric
evaluation of the defendant by the doctors at St. Elizabeth's Hos-
pital in Washington, D.C."
In 1971, the Fourth Circuit again discussed its insanity formu-
lation in United States v. Taylor.59 In Taylor, the Court suggested
that an individual, to be found criminally responsible, must not
only be fully aware of what he was doing when he committed the
act, but also "must have had sufficient internal controls over his
actions to conform them to the requirements of the law.""0 The
Court resolved any doubt about the mutual exclusivity of the two
conditions, found in the first paragraph of the A.L.I. formulation,
that remove criminal responsibility. Furthermore, in considering
the concept of the defendant appreciating the criminality of his
act, the Court apparently equated "appreciate" with "knowledge"
and "awareness,"" a concept consistent with the belief that the
term "appreciate" not only requires intellectual knowledge but
also necessitates a finding of emotional awareness. The Court in
Taylor affirmed the expansive nature of the A.L.I. formulation by
expressing its disfavor of a restrictive interpretation of the specific
facets of the test.6 3
" To us, the conclusion is inescapable that medical experts find that
defendant suffered from a mental defect manifested by psychological
tests and by his conduct during the testing and during interviews, as well
as by antisocial conduct, and that this defect had deprived him of crimi-
nal responsibility as defined by the A.L.I. We do not decide that McGirr
was insane under the A.L.I. test.
Id. at 849.
57 Id.
11 Certainly, an evaluation of what, in the defendant's psychiatric report, was
significant to the Court will be helpful to counsel on either side of the litigation.
' 437 F.2d 371 (4th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 378 n.11.
Id. See notes 22-38 and accompanying text supra.
62 See notes 34-36 and accompanhing text supra.
437 F.2d at 378 n.11.
[Vol. 78
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Finally, in United States v. Smith,64 the Fourth Circuit stated
that Chandler and the A.L.I. formulation essentially caused two
issues to be raised when the insanity plea was made: "(1) the
existence of mental disease or defect and (2) its meaningful rela-
tionship to the incident charged as an offense"." The Court re-
ferred to the District of Columbia Circuit case of United States v.
Brawner" for an evaluation of the distinction between mental dis-
ease and mental defect. 7 In Smith, the Court emphasized its de-
sire for a very definitive analysis of the defendant's condition by
the use of an extensive examination of his whole personality."8
Most important, the trial court was cautioned that the right of the
defendant to fully develop his insanity plea must take priority over
the desire to expedite the trial." Undeniably, the Fourth Circuit
finds it unequivocally necessary to present to the jury an unab-
breviated inquiry into all of the facts and circumstances that may
shed light on the defendant's alleged mental infirmity.
Interestingly, the states composing the jurisdiction of the
Fourth Circuit have not uniformly adopted the A.L.I. formulation
of criminal responsibility. Only two states, Maryland and West
Virginia, have followed the lead of the Fourth Circuit. In Mary-
land, a variation of the Chandler A.L.I. formulation was adopted
by statute; 0 whereas in West Virginia, the Chandler version was
507 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 711 n.2.
c' 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc).
67 The term "mental disease" differs from "mental defect" in that
the former is a condition which is either capable of improving or deterio-
rating and the latter is a condition not capable of improving or deteriorat-
ing.
Id. at 1008 (Appendix B).
0 To this end, the trial judge should permit "an unrestricted inquiry
into the whole personality of a defendant" and should "be free in his
admission of all possibly relevant evidence." Any evidence of aberrant
conduct or action, whether before or after the act charged, is accordingly
admissible under the plea.
507 F.2d at 711 (footnotes omitted).
[W]here the plea is insanity, the goal of expediting the trial must
not be allowed to interfere with the defendant's right to develop fully and
completely the many complex and often tenuous circumstances that may
shed light on his plea. This is the command of Chandler.
Id. at 712.
7' MD. CODE ANN. art. 59, § 25 (1972) provides, in pertinent part, that:
(a) A defendant is not responsible for criminal conduct and shall be
found insane at the time of the commission of the alleged crime if, at the
time of such conduct as a result of mental disorder, he lacks substantial
10
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more closely followed by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals.7 ' In both North Carolina 2 and South Carolina," the rule of
law is that commonly known as the M'Naghten rule. The Vir-
ginia 75 rule evidently allows for both the use of the M'Naghten rule
capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of the law. As used in this section, the
terms "mental disorder" do not include an abnormality manifested only
by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.
See also Love v. State, 16 Md. App. 364, 297 A.2d 309 (1972); Truesdale v. State,
16 Md. App. 260, 295 A.2d 808 (1972); Young v. State, 14 Md. App. 538, 288 A.2d
198 (1972).
1' The West Virginia Court of Appeals stated:
We do not adopt any rigid language for the trial courts to use in instruct-
ing or charging the jury in such cases, but simply recommend that they
adopt an approach based on the Model Penal Code referred to herein and
dispense with the more limited test of right and wrong followed in the
M'Naghten Rule. We would approve of an instruction to the effect that
an accused is not responsible for his act if, at the time of the act, it was
the result of a mental disease or defect causing the accused to lack the
capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act, or to conform
his act to the requirements of the law.
State v. Grimm, 195 S.E.2d 637, 647 (W. Va. 1973). See State v. Myers, 222 S.E.2d
300 (W. Va. 1976).
72 [T]he test of insanity as a defense to a criminal charge is the
capacity to distinguish between right and wrong at the time of and in
respect to the matter under investigation. . . . "North Carolina, as well
as many other jurisdictions, has steadfastly refused to recognize the 'ir-
restible impulse doctrine' as a test of criminal responsibility."
State v. Cooper, 286 N.C. 549, 569, 213 S.E.2d 305, 318 (1975); accord, State v.
Westmore, 287 N.C. 344, 215 S.E.2d 51 (1975).
73 We are aware of the alternatives which some courts have adopted,
but are not convinced that the other rules set forth a better formula for
determining whether a person accused of crime should be excused be-
cause of his mental condition. It should be comforting to those who would
attack the M'Naghten rule to realize that a layman jury, regardless of the
rule recited, normally takes a common sense approach and determines
whether the accused person is, first, guilty or not guilty, and if guilty,
whether his mental condition is such that he ought to be excused of the
crime because of his mental condition. We adhere to the M'Naghten rule.
State v. Cannon, 260 S.C. 537, 547, 197 S.E.2d 678, 682 (1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1067 (1973).
7' For a discussion of the M'Naghten rule, see A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND
THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 135-49 (1974); A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 45-
66 (1967); J. BIGGS, JR., THE GUILTY MIND 95-117 (1955); Waelder, Psychiatry and
the Problem of Criminal Responsibility, 101(WOO)UN U. PA. L. REV. 378 (1952);
Wingo, Squaring M'Naghten with Precedent-An Historical Note, 26 S.C. L. REv.
81 (1974).
7 Since the "right or wrong" instruction is predicated on the
incapacity of a defendant to distinguish right from wrong and the "irres-
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and the "irresistible impulse" test.6
The "lack-of-criminal-responsibility" defense, as it relates to
drug addiction or alcoholism, would appear to be a significant
defense only under limited circumstances in the Fourth Circuit. In
Driver v. Hinnant," the Fourth Circuit, while striking down the
North Carolina public drunkenness statute, distinguished volun-
tary from involuntary intoxication, finding that only the chronic
alcoholic may be excused for those crimes that are caused by the
disease.7 Although the Fourth Circuit has not specifically ruled
upon whether drug addiction may cause insanity, in United States
v. McGough,79 the Court found no error where the district court
instructed the jury according to Chandler"° on this issue. This rul-
ing does not constitute approval by the Court of the concept that
drug dependence may create insanity, especially since the Court
cited to authorities from other jurisdictions unfavorable to such an
istable impulse" instruction is predicated on the capacity to make such
a distinction, different evidence is required to support each instruction.
Davis v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 681, 682, 204 S.E.2d 272, 273 (1974) (emphasis
by Court).
The irresistable impulse doctrine is applicable only to that class of cases
where the accused is able to understand the nature and consequences of
his act and knows it is wrong, but his mind has become so impaired by
disease that he is totally deprived of the mental power to control or
restrain his act.
Id.; Thompson v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 704, 718, 70 S.E.2d 284, 292 (1952).
"' For a discussion of the "irresistible impulse" test, see A. GOLDSTEIN, THE
INSANITY DEFENSE 67-79 (1967). This outstanding work provides the Virginia practi-
tioner with an excellent analysis of the elements of this test. Interestingly, Gold-
stein cites to Thompson, supra note 75, when discussing the "misnamed"
irresistible impulse rule. GOLDSTEIN at 67 n.1. See also A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY
AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 160-65 (1974).
356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
7" [V]oluntary drunkenness is no excuse for crime. The chronic alco-
holic has not drunk voluntarily, although undoubtedly he did so origi-
nally. His excess now derives from disease. However, our excusal of the
chronic alcoholic from criminal prosecution is confined exclusively to
those acts on his part which are compulsive as symptomatic of the dis-
ease. With respect to other behavior-not characteristic of confirmed
chronic alcoholism-he would be judged as would any person not so af-
fected.
Id. at 764. Brooks feels the case is significant to the extent that "the court also held
that the compulsive alcoholic lacked the evil intent or consciousness of wrongdoing
which is an essential of mens rea." A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL
HEALTH SYSTEM 253 (1974).
7' 410 F.2d 458 (4th Cir. 1969).
11 See note 22 supra.
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interpretation." The states included within the Fourth Circuit are
in substantial accord with these rulings in the federal arena. The
possibility of drug or alcohol induced insanity should not be ig-
nored." The drug or alcohol induced insanity defense appears to
be coming more acceptable to the various courts.'
III. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE
A. Competency of Counsel
The competency of counsel is perhaps a sour note upon which
to begin a discussion of the practical implications of an insanity
defense, but it is certainly an area counsel cannot ignore. If counsel
neglects to raise the issue of the competency of the defendant to
stand trial when the defense is justified by the facts and circum-
stances, such failure to act may be deemed ineffective assistance
of counsel. In Kibert v. Peyton," a defense counsel who had fifteen
to sixteen years of experience failed to request a competency hear-
ing to determine whether the defendant was competent to stand
trial, even though the attorney "entertained substantial doubts as
to his client's sanity.""8 On these facts the court stated that "[i]n
similar circumstances, we held that the failure of the defendant's
lawyer to explore the matter and adduce evidence in court where
11 (A] mere showing of narcotics addiction, without more, does not
constitute "some evidence" of mental disease or insanity so as to raise
the issue of criminal responsibility.
Bailey v. United States, 386 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1967) quoting from Heard v. United
States, 348 F.2d 43, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
" See State v. McLaughlin, 286 N.C. 597, 213 S.E.2d 238 (1975); State v.
Bellue, 260 S.C. 39, 194 S.E.2d 193 (1973); Chittum v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 12,
174 S.E.2d 779 (1970); Parker v. State, 7 Md. App. 167, 254 A.2d 381 (1969); State
v. Phillips, 80 W. Va. 748, 93 S.E. 828 (1917).
See People v. Kelly, 10 Cal. 3d 565, 516 P.2d 875, 111 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1973),
finding that a continued use of drugs could create insanity. The case is discussed
in A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 251-52 (1974).
"1 Much has been written recently about the drug or alcohol induced insanity
defense. See Bennett, Drug Addiction and its Effect on Criminal Responsibility, 9
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 179 (1973); Diamond, Criminal Responsibility of the Addict:
Conviction by Force of Habit, 1 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 395 (1973); Fingarett,
Addiction and Criminal Responsibilities, 84 YALE L.J. 413 (1975); Lunter, Effect
of Drug-Induced Intoxication on the Issue of Criminal Responsibility, 8 CrnM. L.
BULL. 731 (1972); Smith, Drink, Drugs and Criminal Responsibility, 124 NEw L.J.
129 (1974); Wald, Alcohol, Drugs and Criminal Responsibility, 63 GEO. L.J. (1974).
See also Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1236 (1966).
383 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1967).
383 F.2d at 569.
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there was reason for doubt as to the mental condition of the ac-
cused constituted a denial of his right to effective assistance of
counsel."" The court, in making the foregoing statement, relied
upon Owsley v. Peyton8 and Caudill v. Peyton,9 both of which
were decided by the Fourth Circuit. In Owsley, the court specifi-
cally held that the failure of the defendant's counsel to request a
determination of the accused's mental capacity to understand the
nature of the charge against him and to assist in his defense
amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel when there was rea-
sonable ground for questioning the defendant's competency. 0 In
Caudill, the court did not specifically rule on the issue of the effec-
tiveness of defendant's counsel, but did imply that the failure of
the accused's counsel to inquire into both the sanity of the defen-
dant at the time of the offense and his competence to stand trial
raised serious questions as to the effective assistance of counsel.9
Undeniably, the Fourth Circuit is providing fair warning to
defense counsel that a failure to inquire into the sanity of the
defendant, both at the time of the offense and at the time of the
trial, may lead to a reversal on the ground of ineffective assistance
of counsel. The decision of whether to utilize the insanity defense
is a difficult one at best,92 but the defense should never be ignored.
B. Acquiring Expert Assistance
By statute, an indigent defendant has been provided a means
to obtain expert psychiatric assistance in the preparation of his
insanity defense.23 Although 18 U.S.C.A. § 30006A(e) (1975 Cum.
Id.
368 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1966).
" 368 F.2d 563 (4th Cir. 1966).
g' "The lawyer's failure to adduce it in court, we think, rendered his
representation of Owsley ineffective to the point of depriving him of his
constitutional right'to counsel." Id. at 1003.
Id. at 564-65.
02 See Chernoff & Schaffer, Defending the Mentally Ill: Ethical Quicksand, 10
Am. CRim. L. REV. 505 (1972).
D3 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A (Cum. Supp. 1975) provides in part:
(e) Services other than counsel.-
(1) Upon request.-Counsel for a person who is financially unable to
obtain investigative, expert, or other services necessary for an adequate
defense may request them in an ex parte application. Upon finding, after
appropriate inquiry in an ex parte proceeding, that the services are neces-
sary and that the person is financially unable to obtain them, the court,
or the United States magistrate if the services are required in connection
14
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Supp.) does not specifically authorize the furnishing of psychiatric
assistance, it has been so interpreted in the Fourth Circuit." This
statutory provision has been further interpreted by the Fourth
Circuit to mean that the defense may be provided "expert medical
assistance throughout the preparation and presentation of an in-
sanity defense.19 5 A condition precedent to the acquisition of these
services is the requirement that the defense provide a showing of
necessity." The Fourth Circuit has never specifically delineated
the quantum of necessity that would justify the implementation of
the provisions of 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(e); presumably, the district
court would decide in favor of providing the expert services in close
cases because of the Fourth Circuit's desire to fully explore "the
defendant's personality and mental processes"" when the issue of
insanity is raised.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(e) has been interpreted to mean that the
district court should appoint the psychiatrist that the defendant
wishes to employ. The district court is not required to appoint the
psychiatrist chosen by the defense but should do so in the ordinary
case. " If the district court so chooses, it may require the defendant
to pick "two or three doctors from whom the judge may then ap-
point one-assuming multiple availability of psychiatrists in a
with a matter over which he has jurisdiction, shall authorize counsel to
obtain the services.
(2) Without prior request.-Counsel appointed under this section may
obtain, subject to later review, investigative, expert, or other services
without prior authorization if necessary for an adequate defense. The
total cost of services obtained without prior authorization may not exceed
$150 and expenses reasonably incurred.
" "Where a defendant is indigent and claims reason to doubt his sanity, the
government stands ready to supply him with the services of psychiatric experts
necessary to his defense. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(e)." United States v. Albright, 388
F.2d 719, 724 (4th Cir. 1968) (footnote omitted).
"5 United States v. Taylor, 437 F.2d 371, 377 (4th Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted).
Id.
'7 United States v. Butler, 409 F.2d 1261, 1262 (4th Cir. 1969). See also United
States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1968).
" By a way of guidance to the district judges, we suggest that ordi-
narily the appointment of a psychiatrist under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A
should be with the advice and approval of counsel for the particular
defendant. Unless some reason affirmatively appears, and is reflected in
the record, we think that the psychiatrist preferred by the defendant
should be selected by the court.
United States v. Matthews, 472 F.2d 1173, 1174 (4th Cir. 1973). See United States
v. Davis, 481 F.2d 425, 428 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 977 (1973).
" 472 F.2d at 1174.
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given division."'' 0 The optimum circumstance, according to the
Fourth Circuit, is for the government and the defendant to agree
upon one medical witness, thereby avoiding the multiplicity of
expert witnesses.''
C. Self-Incrimination and Government Psychiatric
Examinations
When the defendant raises the insanity defense, he must be
prepared to be examined by a government psychiatrist. Ordering
such an examination is clearly within the inherent power of the
district court when the defendant has been examined by his own
psychiatrist and is raising the defense.'0 The requirement that the
defendant be examined by a government psychiatrist stems from
the belief that a fair state-individual balance cannot be achieved
unless the government is allowed to examine a defendant who has
raised the insanity defense.' 3 This philosophy applies whether or
not the government has provided the defendant with a psychiatrist
at government expense. 04 Furthermore, the defendant has no right
to have his "attorney present during a psychiatric examination
conducted at the instance of the prosecutor."'0 5 The exclusion of
the defendant's attorney is predicated upon the belief that a third
party's presence would severely limit the effectiveness of the exam-
ination, and devices other than the presence of an attorney would
protect the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. 0
The Fourth Circuit firmly believes that compelling a defen-
dant to submit to an examination by a government psychiatrist
does not per se violate the defendant's right not to incriminate
himself.'0 The Fourth Circuit's reasoning is that the purpose of the
mental examination "in any criminal case where a defendant's
sanity is in issue should be, to obtain knowledge not about facts
concerning defendant's participation in the criminal acts charged,
' ' Id. at 1175.
1 Id.
x' United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 722 (4th Cir. 1969). See United
States v. Matthews, 472 F.2d 1173, 1174 (4th Cir. 1973).
" "The maintenance of a 'fair state-individual balance' clearly required that
the government be permitted to have defendant examined." 388 F.2d at 724.
I Id. at 724 n.8.
'o Id. at 726.
'o, Id.; see note 109 infra.
"0 388 F.2d at 723.
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but about facts concerning a defendant which are themselves ma-
terial to the case."'' 8 If the examination of the defendant is made
pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 4244 (1969), no inculpatory statement
made by the defendant is admissible as evidence.'
Undeniably, the requirement that a defendant be examined
by a government psychiatrist is a burden upon the defense, but it
is also an essential prerequisite to a fair trial."0
D. Burden of Proof
Once the decision has been made to raise the insanity defense,
the issue initially devolves to what evidence is necessary to raise
the defense and to whom does the burden shift when the requisite
amount of evidence has been introduced. The initial burden is
upon the defendant to raise the insanity defense"' and the defense
cannot be used if first raised in final argument."' Much to the
advantage of the defendant, the quantum of evidence necessary to
effectively raise the insanity defense is only slight."' Obviously, it
' Id. (footnote omitted).
109 18 U.S.C.A. § 4244 (1969) provides in part:
No statement made by the accused in the course of any examination into
his sanity or mental competency provided for by this section, whether the
examination shall be with or without the consent of the accused, shall be
admitted in evidence against the accused on the issue of guilt in any
criminal proceeding. A finding by the judge that the accused is mentally
competent to stand trial shall in no way prejudice the accused in a plea
of insanity as a defense to the crime charged; such finding shall not be
introduced in evidence on that issue nor otherwise be brought to the
notice of the jury.
But see Hall v. United States, 410 F.2d 653, 661 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
970 (1969), for questions the Fourth Circuit did not consider to be plain error under
the prohibitions in 18 U.S.C.A. § 4244 (1969).
"I See C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 134 (2d ed. 1972); Note, Requiring
a Criminal Defendant to Submit to a Government Psychiatric Examination: An
Invasion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 83 HARV. L. REv. 648 (1970).
But see Lefelt, Pretrial Mental Examinations: Compelled Cooperation and the
Fifth Amendment, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 431 (1972).
" "Insanity may be argued as a defense only if evidence supporting the asser-
tion has been presented." United States v. Green, 468 F.2d 116, 118 (4th Cir. 1972).
"I "When no testimony concerning insanity has been presented, the insanity
defense cannot be advanced initially in final argument." Id.
13 Hall v. United States, 295 F.2d 26 (4th Cir. 1961). In cases subsequent to
Hall, the Fourth Circuit has used the language "slight evidence" in United States
v. McGirr, 434 F.2d 844, 849 (4th Cir. 1970) and in United States v. Green, 468 F.2d
116, 118 (4th Cir. 1972), but has suggested that only "some evidence" is necessary
in United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 724 (4th Cir. 1968). Most recently, the
[Vol. 78
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is critical for both the defense and the government that a determi-
nation be made as to whether the defense has been effectively
raised. Such determination is a question of law for the trial court
to decide."' If the trial court decides that the insanity issue has
been sufficiently raised by the defense, then the burden of proof
shifts to the government ' 5 to prove that the defendant is legally
sane."6 The government must prove the legal sanity of the defen-
dant by proof beyond a reasonable doubt,"7 leaving final determi-
nation of the issue to the jury."'
The Fourth Circuit's system of burdens of proof allows the
government to present a simple case-in-chief, relying upon the
presumption that the defendant is sane."' The government may
ignore the issue of sanity and dwell upon the material elements of
the crime with which the defendant is charged.' 0 The defendant
is then required to raise the issue of insanity in his case-in-chief.
The government then, in rebuttal, must prove the defendant's
sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.'
2
'
E. Witness Utilization
In the Fourth Circuit, both lay and expert witnesses are com-
Fourth Circuit has stated that "[w]henever insanity is asserted as a defense and
is support by any credible evidence . . . ." United States v. Smith, 507 F.2d 710,
711 (4th Cir. 1974) (emphasis added). Whatever language is used, clearly the
amount of proof necessary for the defendant to carry his burden is minimal.
"' United States v. Green, 468 F.2d 116, 118 n.3 (4th Cir. 1972).
"[Ilt is the function of the judge to determine whether the burden of proof
has shifted." United States v. Retolaza, 398 F.2d 235, 241 (4th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1032 (1969).
" United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 724 (4th Cir. 1968).
"I Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 797 (1952); Davis v. United States, 160 U.S.
469 (1895).
,,8 It is the jury's duty to determine the issue of sanity. To permit a
directed verdict would undercut this concept and turn the question of
sanity at the time the crime was committed into a matter to be resolved
by the judge and psychiatrist, eliminating the jury's role.
United States v. Riggs, 470 F.2d 505, 506 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 908
(1973).
" "[The defendant] must ultimately take the initiative in showing he was
not sane because he is everywhere presumed to be sane." A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSAN-
Try DEFENSE 111 (1967) (footnote omitted).
"I "The presumption of sanity serves the purpose of making it unnecessary for
the prosecutor to prove sanity unless the defendant raises the issue." A. BROOKS,
LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 305 (1974).
121 For an excellent analysis of the burden of proof issue, see A. GOLDSTEIN, THE
INSANITY DEFENSE 110-15 (1967).
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petent to testify on the sanity or insanity of a defendant.' 2 The lay
witness is an important element in advancing or attacking an in-
sanity defense.'1' The Fourth Circuit has approved the use of lay
witnesses, inferentially, as long as they describe only what they
have witnessed and refrain from giving conclusions as to the sanity
or insanity of the defendant. 24 No individual should be overlooked
as a possible lay witness. "The least likely person may prove to be
the best witness. Relatives, friends and other acquaintances of the
accused should be interviewed. Employers and fellow workers are
generally willing to disclose any abnormality that they have recog-
nized, the value of which cannot be overemphasized.'2 Impor-
tantly, lay witnesses can describe, in terms easily understandable
to the jury, those facets of the defendant's personality or actions
that give rise to the inference of normalcy or abnormality.'"
In the area of expert witnesses, one may wish to consider the
use of a psychologist,'2 as distinguished from a psychiatrist.' 8 The
12 The term "expert witness" includes both psychologists and psychiatrists in
the context of this article.
'2 Lay witnesses, testifying for the prosecution, will report that the
defendant "looked normal" to them. Policemen and prison guards will
report responsiveness to discipline. Employers will describe satisfactory
work records. Acquaintances will speak of adequate performance in day-
to-day living. The defendant will, in turn, try to demonstrate that how-
ever normal he may have appeared on these occasions, he was very differ-
ent at the time of the crime. Alternatively the defendant or his attorney
may urge that the appearance of normality is a deceptive thing and that
he has not been normal at all. He will try to make this point by producing
lay witnesses who will report on the times when he acted badly, or
strangely, lost control of himself, flew into a rage, thought he was being
poisoned, etc.
A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 26 (1967).
"I "[Tlheir testimony merely described Kibert's behavior as they observed it.
They gave no conclusory opinions as to sanity, but in layman's language these
uneducated and unsophisticatd persons told what they saw." Kibert v. Peyton, 383
F.2d 566, 570 (4th Cir. 1967). See United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 723 (4th
Cir. 1968) wherein the court stated that "[s]anity, as defined by law, under many
authorities can be determined by lay opinion." But see United States v. Kendrick,
331 F.2d 110 (4th Cir. 1964) for a criticism of the use of lay witnesses to review
medical files.
'2 Shadoan, Raising the Insanity Defense: The Practical Side, 10 AM. CrIm.
L. REV. 533, 547 n.47 (1972).
126 Id.
'2 A "psychologist" may be defined as one specializing in psychology with
"psychology" being basically defined as the study of mind and behavior in relation
to a particular field of knowledge or activity. WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DIcTIONARY 689 (1965).
l A "psychiatrist" is "a physician specializing in psychiatry," with "psychia-
[Vol. 78
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Fourth Circuit has specifically held that "a clinical psychologist
may be permitted to testify as an expert and that each case must
be decided upon its own facts.' 1 29 The Court specifically suggested
that the competency of a psychologist to testify was based, not
upon the label of psychologist or psychiatrist but upon the nature
and extent of the witness's knowledge.2" The determination
whether or not the testimony of the psychologist is admissible is
left to the discretion of the trial court, which is subject to review
for abuse of discretion. 3' Presumably, since the Fourth Circuit
considers a psychologist, under appropriate circumstances, to be
an expert witness, the indigent defendant should be able to acquire
such expert assistance pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(e) (1975
Cum. Supp.).132 Certainly the psychologist, with his expertise in
the field of testing and interpreting raw data about the defendant's
mental condition, could be of immeasurable benefit to either side
of a criminal trial. 13
One should consider the use of the psychiatrist as an expert
witness in a case involving the insanity defense. Care should be
taken in selecting a psychiatrist for use as an expert witness.'34 The
Fourth Circuit has expressly encouraged the use of expert medical
opinions,"15 finding that such testimony, assuming it has a bearing
try" being defined as "a branch of medicine that deals with mental, emotional, or
behavioral disorders." WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 689 (1965).
"' United States v. Riggleman, 411 F.2d 1190, 1191 (4th Cir. 1969).
' [Tihe better rule is that the determination of a psychologist's
comptence to render an expert opinion based on his findings as to the
presence or absence of mental disease or defect must depend upon the
nature and extent of his knowledge; it does not depend upon his claim to
the title of psychologist or psychiatrist.
Id.
I '11 Id.
22 See notes 93-101 and accompanying text supra.
'3 Notably, the Fourth Circuit also allows the introduction of a psychologist's
expert testimony in the civil arena. See Hidden v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of
New York, 217 F.2d 818, 821 (4th Cir. 1954).
"I One authority in the field has suggested that:
Psychiatrists employed in government mental hospitals are often organi-
cally oriented and conservative. They insist that there be some physical
manifestation of abnormality before arriving at a diagnosis of mental
disorder. Generally, the defense attorney will prefer a doctor with psy-
choanalytic training as he will be more inclined to emphasize personality
development and the dynamics of human behavior rather than objective
findings of physical abnormality.
Shadoan, Raising the Insanity Defense: The Practical Side, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
533, 548 n.48 (1972).
'1 United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 723 (4th Cir. 1968).
20
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upon the issue of insanity, "has a rightful place in the record.' 30
Expert psychiatric assistance is found to be particularly useful in
the guiding of the attorneys' 37 and in the assisting of the jury. '3 The
psychiatrist is allowed to consider the observations of others in
making a determination as to the mental condition of the defen-
dant,'39 but "if the facts were not what the doctors supposed, their
opinions [are] baseless and of no evidentiary value."'4 Impor-
tantly, when the expert medical witness is testifying, he should
avoid conclusions but be allowed to discuss in simple terms the
facts and circumstances that surround his diagnosis.' The Fourth
Circuit, in evidencing its dislike of conclusions by expert witnesses,
has even stated that mere conclusions cannot be found to be bind-
ing upon a jury."' Counsel must be extremely thorough in direct
examination of an expert medical witness. Care should be taken
'' Rhodes v. United States, 282 F.2d 59 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 912
(1960) (footnote omitted).
'- Consultation with counsel attunes the lay attorney to unfamiliar
but central medical concepts and enables him, as an initial matter, to
assess the soundness and advisability of offering the defense. The aid of
a psychiatrist informs and guides the presentation of the defense, and
perhaps most importantly, it permits a lawyer inexpert in the science of
psychiatry to probe intelligently the foundations of adverse testimony.
United States v. Taylor, 437 F.2d 371, 377 n.9 (4th Cir. 1971).
'- The purpose of such testimony is to enlarge the vision and under-
standing of the triers of fact. It does not take the decision out of the hands
of the jury, but allows those with specialized knowledge to enlighten the
jury an enable it to perform its function intelligently.
Rhodes v. United States, 282 F.2d 59, 61 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 912
(1960).
"I "It is elementary that an expert is permitted to take into account the testi-
mony of others as to what they observed, and upon his interpretation to offer an
informed professional opinion." Kibert v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 566, 570 (4th Cir. 1967).
1,0 Carpenter v. United States, 264 F.2d 565, 570 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 360
U.S. 936 (1959).
"I We may notice, however, the obvious importance of great care on
the part of court and witnesses to see that [the use by expert witnesses
of diagnostic labels and conclusionary medical terms], whenever they are
used, are explained to the jury to the end that the jury is given a full
picture of the defendant's personality in language which the jurors may
understand.
United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920, 926 n.17 (4th Cir. 1968) (en banc). Accord,
United States v. Butler, 409 F.2d 1216, 1262 (4th Cir. 1969). See Note, Criminal
Lauw-Guidelines for Expert Testimony in the Insanity Defense-Making the "Prod-
uct" Palpable, 18 DE PAUL L. REv. 812, 822 n.45 (1969).
"' "Nor are unqualified and unexplained conclusions of a witness binding upon
a jury when their factual bases are not probed or explained." United States v.
Wilson, 399 F.2d 459, 463 (4th Cir. 1968).
[Vol. 78
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to insure that a full, factual disclosure of the basis of the expert's
testimony occurs. In this context, counsel must insure that the
length of the examination of the defendant, by either the defense
or the government expert, is of a sufficient length to justify the
conclusions obtained.' The Fourth Circuit has specifically held
that a "ten-minute" interview is insufficient time for an expert
medical witness to determine what the mental state of a defendant
was at the time of the commission of a crime.
44
The Fourth Circuit follows the general rule of restricting'
cross-examination of an expert witness to matters brought out on
direct examination and matters concerning the credibility of the
witness.'46 When the insanity defense is raised, the scope of cross-
examination may be somewhat more expansive than the general
restrictive rule because the Fourth Circuit has found the cause and
events related to the mental condition of the defendant to be mate-
rial.'47 Therefore, if the trial court limits inquiry into these areas,
reversal may be warranted on the basis of abuse of discretion."'
"I Jurors assume that the patient was thoroughly observed and ade-
quately diagnosed. . . . The revelation, brought out by. appropriate
questioning, that the doctor saw the patient only for a brief period when
the accused was interviewed in a staff conference just before reporting to
the court, is often shocking to the jury.
Shadoan, Raising the Insanity Defense: The Practical Side, 10 Am. CRIm. L. REV.
533, 553 n.60 (1972).
"I [A]n inquiry into possible lack of criminal responsibility at the
time of commission of the offense involves a complex evaluation of his
total personality at a previous point in time. It requires that the expert
have a substantial opportunity to observe the defendant and his mental
processes.
The ten minute interview was insufficient for such a determination.
United States v. Taylor, 437 F.2d 371, 378 (4th Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted). See
Annot., 23 A.L.R. Fed. 710 (1975).
"I For a discussion of the restrictive rule of cross-examination, see McCoRMICK,
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 21 at 47 (2d ed. 1972).
"I United States v. Williams, 478 F.2d 369, 371 (4th Cir. 1973). The Fourth
Circuit rule comports with the newer Rule 611 (b), of the Federal Rules of Evidence:
Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct
examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The
court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional
matters as if on direct examination.
" "When a condition of temporary insanity is claimed to have existed, its
cause and the events which created it seem obviously material to the inquiry into
the existence of the claimed disability." Carpenter v. United States, 264 F.2d 565,
569 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 936 (1959). See United States v. Smith, 507
F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1974).
"I "We recognize that the District Judge has wide discretion in limiting cross-
22
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The Fourth Circuit has limited the scope of cross-examination so
that a prosecutor may not normally cross-examine an expert medi-
cal witness, who is testifying on mental competency, about crimi-
nal responsibility.'49 The converse of this proposition is equally
true. However, if the defendant's counsel opens the door by inquir-
ing of an expert medical witness about both mental competency
and criminal responsibility, the government may then properly
cross-examine concerning both inquiries.5 ' Cross-examination of
expert medical witnesses is a crucial aspect of the attempt to
achieve a favorable verdict, and accordingly, should be carefully
prepared.''
As a final note on the expert witness, counsel may wish to
retain his expert witness with him in the courtroom. Two theories
may be advanced to achieve this objective. First, suggest to the
court that the expert witness should be allowed to remain in the
courtroom so that he may formulate a more intelligent opinion
concerning the mental condition of the defendant by hearing what
other witnesses are saying about the defendant. The persuasive
appeal of this argument stems from the fact that the Fourth Cir-
cuit permits an expert medical witness to formulate an opinion
based upon the testimony of others."'5 Second, counsel may analog-
ize the attempt to keep an expert medical witness in the courtroom
to the situation where an officer in charge of the investigation of a
case is allowed to remain in the courtroom and advise the prosecu-
tion, a practice permitted by the Fourth Circuit.'53 The persuasive
appeal of this argument is questionable, although there is ample
examination .... However, where the information sought to be elicited is highly
relevant, even crucial to the case, it is clear abuse of judicial discretion to shut off
inquiry." United States v. Ketchem, 420 F.2d 901, 903 (4th Cir. 1969).
,"I We have little doubt that the difference in standards governing a
defendant's competence to stand trial from those which govern his men-
tal capacity to commit crime ordinarily would preclude a prosecutor from
cross-examining a psychiatrist who has expressed an opinion on one
about the other. In the usual case, a prosecutor should not thus be per-
mitted to confuse the two inquiries in his examination of a psychiatric
witness.
United States v. Retolaza, 398 F.2d 235, 240 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1032 (1969).
' Id.
For excellent examples of cross-examination questions, see Shadoan,
Raising the Insanity Defense: The Practical Side, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 533, 550
n.54; 1 A.L.R. Fed. 965, 970 (1966).
,52 Kibert v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 566, 570 (4th Cir. 1967).
'3 Shoppel v. United States, 270 F.2d 413, 417 (4th Cir. 1959).
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authority for the proposition that the officer in charge of a case
may be permitted, in the discretion of the court, to remain in the
courtroom assisting the government's counsel."'
F. Instructions
The position of the Fourth Circuit, in the area of instructions,
is extremely flexible, taking into account variances that may arise
from the factual circumstances of different cases."' The A.L.I.
formulation of criminal responsibility is clearly adopted, but no
specific form of words is required.'5' On one occasion, the Fourth
Circuit has suggested that certain material elements should be
included in the charge to the jury. 57 In United States v. Wilson,'
the Fourth Circuit considered a specific charge given by a trial
court:
The jury was told, in pertinent part, that even though Wilson
knew the difference between right and wrong and knew that the
act he was committing was wrong he should be acquitted if "his
will, that is to say, the governing power of his mind, has been
so impaired that his actions are not subject to it but are beyond
his control."' 5
'" United States v. Frazier, 417 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1013, reh. denied, 398 U.S. 945 (1970); United States v. Harris, 409 F.2d 77
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 965 (1969); United States v. Adams, 376 F.2d 824
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 883 (1967); United States v. Leggett, 326 F.2d 613
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 955 (1964).
"5 In formulating specific instructions to a jury or the standards
which control a court's findings, the particular circumstances of the case
may not be disregarded, and the issue as framed by the testimony may
require changes in the choice of words. We avoid the imposition of rigid
formulas.
United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920, 927 (4th Cir. 1968) (en banc).
'I " [W]hile our approval of the American Law Institute's formulation is un-
equivocal and unreserved, we proscribe no other form of words which may appear
more appropriate in a given case now or in cases generally in the future." Id.
, I If the charge appropriately embraces and requires positive conclu-
sions by the jury as to the defendant's cognition, his volition, and his
capacity to control his behavior, and if these three elements of knowledge,
will and choice are emphasized in the charge as essential and critical
constituents of legal sanity, we shall usually regard the charge as legally
sufficient.
United States v. Butler, 409 F.2d 1261, 1263 n.3 (4th Cir. 1969), quoting Pope v.
United States, 372 F.2d 710, 736 (1967), vacated on other grounds, 392 U.S. 651
(1968).
'' 399 F.2d 459 (4th Cir. 1968).
'' 399 F.2d at 463.
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The Fourth Circuit held, that although this instruction differed
from the A.L.I. formulation, it essentially instructed the jury pro-
perly. 6 0
In drafting instructions, one should be careful to include all
of the elements deemed necessary by the Fourth Circuit. Flexibil-
ity is not the equivalent of inaccuracy. The District of Columbia
Circuit Court in United States v. Brawner, "I provided counsel with
a suggested insanity instruction when a variation of the A.L.I.
formulation was adopted."'* Although the instruction in Brawner
" The instruction ... differs from the American Law Institute
formulation but slightly. There is no direct reference to substantiality of
capacity to control his conduct, but it suggested to the jury that if the
act was beyond Wilson's impaired capacity, they should acquit. The
American Law Institute does no more. Importantly, the instruction does
not imply that the jury must find a general destruction of the defendant's
will as Davis [Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895)] does; impair-
ment is enough if the act is beyond the reach of the diminished capacity
to control.
Id. (Note, the instruction here was affirmatively approved by the defense counsel
and was not an issue on appeal.)
'' 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc).
IG2 SUGGESTION FOR INSTRUCTION IN INSANITY
The defendant in this case asserts the defense of insanity.
You are not to consider this defense unless you have first found that
the Government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each essential
element of the offense. One of these elements is the requirement (of
premeditation and deliberation for first degree murder or of specific in-
tent for __), on which you have already been instructed. In determining
whether that requirement has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
you may consider the testimony as to the defendant's normal mental
condition.
If you find that the government has failed to prove beyond a reason-
able doubt any one or more of the essential elements of the offense, you
must find the defendant not guilty, and you should not consider any
possible verdict relating to insanity.
If you find that the Government has proved each essential element
of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must consider whether
to bring in the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
The law provides that a jury shall bring in a verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity if, at the time of the criminal conduct, the defendant,
as a result of mental disease or defect, either lacked substantial capacity
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, or lacked substan-
tial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. [In the
Fourth Circuit, substitute "criminality" for "wrongfulness."]
Every man is presumed to be sane, that is to be without mental
disease or defect, and to be responsible for his acts. But that presumption
no longer controls when evidence is introduced that he may have a mental
disease or defect.
[Vol. 78
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The term insanity does not require a showing that the defendant was
disoriented as to time or place.
Mental disease or defect includes any abnormal condition of the
mind, regardless of its medical label, which substantially affects mental
or emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior controls. The
term "behavior controls" refers to the processes and capacity of a person
to regulate and control his conduct and actions.
In considering whether the defendant had a mental disease or defect
at the time of the unlawful act with which he is charged, you may con-
sider testimony in this case concerning the development, adaption and
functioning of these mental and emotional processes and behavior con-
trols.
The term "mental disease" differs from "mental defect" in that the
former is a condition which is either capable of improving or deteriorating
and the latter is a condition not capable of improving or deteriorating.
Burden of proof-alternate versions:
(a) The burden of proof is on the defendant to establish by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that, as a result of mental disease or defect,
he either lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of the law or lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct. If defendant has met that burden you shall
bring in a verdict of not guilty of the offenses you found proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.
(b) The burden is on the Government to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt either that the defendant was not suffering from a mental disease
or defect, or else that he nevertheless had substantial capacity both to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law and to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct. If the Government has not established this
beyond a reasonable doubt, you shall bring in a verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity.
Evaluation of Testimony
In considering the issue of insanity, you may consider the evidence
that has been admitted as to the defendant's mental condition before and
after the offense charged, as well as the evidence as to defendant's mental
condition on that date. The evidence as to the defendant's mental condi-
tion before and after that date was admitted solely for the purpose of
assisting you to determine the defendant's condition on the date of the
alleged offense.
You have heard the evidence of psychiatrists and psychologists who
testified as expert witnesses. An expert in a particular field is permitted
to give his opinion in evidence. In this connection, you are instructed that
you are not bound by medical labels, definitions, or conclusions as to
what is or is not a mental disease (or defect). What psychiatrists (and
psychologists) may or may not consider a mental disease (or defect) for
clinical purposes, where their concern is treatment, may or may not be
the same as mental disease (or defect) for the purpose of determining
criminal responsibility. Whether the defendant had a mental disease (or
defect) must be determined by you under the explanation of those terms
as it has been given to you by the Court.
There was also testimony of lay witnesses, with respect to their obser-
vations of defendant's appearance, behavior, speech, and actions. Such
persons are permitted to testify as to their own observations and other
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would not be entirely useful since variations exist between the
Fourth Circuit's and the D.C. Circuit's insanity formulation, refer-
ence to it would be useful as a guide to counsel in drafting instruc-
tions that would be appropriate in the Fourth Circuit.
G. The Jury and the Insanity Defense
Any decision surrounding whether or not to use the insanity
defense must realistically be based, at least in part, upon a consid-
eration of the jury, for it is they who must eventually decide the
facts known to them and may express an opinion based upon those obser-
vations and facts known to thin. In weighing the testimony of such lay
witnesses, you may consider the circumstances of each witness, his oppor-
tunity to observe the defendant and to know the facts to which he has
testified, his willingness and capacity to expound freely as to his observa-
tions and knowledge, the basis for his opinion and conclusions, and the
nearness or remoteness of his observations of the defendant in point of
time to the commission of the offense charged.
You may also consider whether the witness observed extraordinary
or bizzare acts performed by the defendant or whether the witness ob-
served the defendant's conduct to be free of such extraordinary or bizarre
acts. In evaluating such testimony, you should take into account the
extent of the witness's observation of the defendant and the nature and
length of time of the witness's contact with the defendant, You should
bear in mind that an untrained person may not be readily able to detect
mental disease (or defect) and that the failure of a lay witness to observe
abnormal acts by the defendant may be significant only if the witness had
prolonged and intimate contact with the defendant.
You are not bound by the opinions of either expert or lay witnesses.
You should not arbitrarily or capriciously reject the testimony of any
witness, but you should consider the testimony of each witness in connec-
tion with the other evidence in the case and give it such weight as you
believe it is fairly entitled to receive.
You may also consider that every man is presumed to be sane, that
is, to be without mental disease (or defect), and to be responsible for his
acts. You should consider this principle in the light of all the evidence in
the case and give it such weight as you believe it is fairly entitled to
receive.
Effect of verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
If the defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity, it becomes
the duty of the court to commit him to St. Elizabeth's Hospital. There
will be a hearing within 50 days to determine whether defendant is enti-
tled to release. In that hearing the defendant has the burden of proof. The
defendant will remain in custody, and will be entitled to release from
custody only if the Court finds by preponderance of the evidence that he
is not likely to injure himself or other persons due to mental illness.
Note: If the defendant so requests, this instruction need not be
given.
471 F.2d 1008 (Appendix B).
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issue of the mental condition of the defendant.'3 To this end, "it
is of critical importance that the defendant's entire relevant symp-
tomatology be brought before the jury.""'6 Unfortunately, juries are
not generally favorably disposed to the insanity defense"6 5 and,
accordingly, have been attacked as an inappropriate-body to whom
should be left the decision of sanity or insanity.6 '
If the insanity defense is deemed to be the most appropriate
defense for the accused, counsel should be aware of the fact that
the success or failure of the defense may depend upon the ability
of the defendant to persuade the jury that he is mentally ill.167
Fortunately for the defense, "[tihe A.L.I. formulation requires
less evidence to sustain a finding of insanity thereby assisting the
defendant, and more accurately shifting the production and per-
suasion burdens to the prosecution.""'6 Through the liberalized
procedures allowed under the A.L.I. formulation, the defense
should also attempt to have their expert witnesses explain why the
defendant is actually abnormal even though he appears quite nor-
mal at the trial.
Counsel should also inquire into the background of the juror.
Generally, those jurors with higher educational backgrounds have
'1 United States v. Riggs, 470 F.2d 505, 506 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 908 (1973); United States v. McGirr, 434 F.2d 844, 849 (4th Cir. 1970).
"I United States v. Smith, 507 F.2d 710,711 (4th Cir. 1974) (footnote omitted).
'1 [Jiuries do not, as a general rule, respond favorably to the insan-
ity defense. Most jurors subscribe to the view prevalent in our society that
an individual should be held accountable for what he does. Only with
reluctance will they shield an offender from punishment for an admitted
offense on the basis of some ephemeral psychological "disorder."
Shadoan, Raising the Insanity Defense: The Practical Side, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
533, 535 (1972).
,"I See M. GUTrMACHER, THE ROLE OF PSYCHIATRY IN LAW 13-14 (1968); Har-
rington, Is the Accused Insane? 12 Laymen Shouldn't Decide, 2 TEX. So. L. REv.
195 (1972-73). See also, United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920, 928 (4th Cir. 1968)
(en banc).
"I Jurors find it difficult to accept the idea of serious mental disorder
unless it is accompanied by visible and gross psychotic symptoms-either
a breakdown in intellect or the loss of self-control. In this respect, they
share the reluctance of most people to concede that persons who seem
very much like themselves may be seriously ill. Under such circumstan-
ces, defense counsel is understandably reluctant to assert the defense
unless his client is reasonably likely to persuade the jury he is insane.
A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 63 (1967).
1' Higley, Requirements of Uniformity and the Federal Formulation of Crimi-
nal Responsibility, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 421, 436 (1971-72).
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been found to be more favorable toward psychiatry. 6 ' Addition-
ally, the juror with the higher occupational status will be more
inclined to react favorably toward psychiatry, 70 as do those jurors
who have previously served in criminal trials.' The significance
of a juror's feelings toward psychiatry is that "a bigger percentage
of those unfavorable toward psychiatry feel that the defendant, as
an individual, should be held fully responsible for his crime.' ' 2
Individuals favorable to psychiatry have a greater tendency to act
impartially when considering an insanity plea, have a tendency to
consider mitigating factors when confronted with the issue of
criminal responsibility,, and are more receptive to the use of psy-
chiatrists in the criminal trial. 7 3 Undoubtedly, the careful selec-
tion of jurors may have a substantial impact upon the successful
or unsuccessful attempt to employ the insanity defense.'
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has been an attempt to provide those involved in
criminal litigation with at least a foothold into the realm of legal
insanity. The intricacies of a defense based upon the accused's
lack-of-criminal-responsibility create a need for all to be well
versed in the developments in the law so as to insure that the ends
of justice are achieved. The Fourth Circuit has conceptualized a
workable legal framework within which one may operate in assert-
ing or opposing an insanity defense. The obligation is now upon
counsel to utilize the law provided to its maximum potential.
Michael Frank Pezzulli
'6, "This table shows that 54.33 percent of those favorable toward psychiatry
have at least a college level of education while only 30 percent of those unfavorable
to psychiatry have a college level of education." Arafat & McCahery, The Insanity
Defense and the Juror, 22 DRAKE L. REv. 538, 542 (1973).
"I' "This table shows that 57.7 percent of those with favorable attitudes toward
psychiatry have higher status occupations, being professional or white collar work-
ers whereas only 32 percent of those unfavorable toward psychiatry can be found
in the same occupational levels." Id.
,"I "Of the jurors with experience, 83.33 percent had a favorable attitude to-
ward psychiatry while only 16.67 percent had an unfavorable attitude. Of the jurors
without experience, 62.5 percent were favorable toward psychiatry while 37.5 per-
cent were unfavorable." Id. at 543.
2 Id. at 544.
, Id. at 549.
'7' For additional information on the jury and its attitude toward the insanity
defense, see R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY (1967); M. GuTr-
MACHER, THE ROLE OF PSYCHIATRY IN LAW 15-18 (1968); J. POLIER, THE ROLE OF LAW
AND THE ROLE OF PSHIATRY 17 n.24 (1968); S. GLUECK, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY, 75-78
(1962).
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